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Abstract—Distributed Hash Table (DHT) lookup is a core
technique in structured peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. Its decen-
tralized nature introduces security and privacy vulnerabilities
for applications built on top of them; we thus set out to design
a lookup mechanism achieving both security and anonymity,
heretofore an open problem. We present Octopus, a novel DHT
lookup which provides strong guarantees for both security and
anonymity. Octopus uses attacker identification mechanisms
to discover and remove malicious nodes, severely limiting an
adversary’s ability to carry out active attacks, and splits lookup
queries over separate anonymous paths and introduces dummy
queries to achieve high levels of anonymity. We analyze the
security of Octopus by developing an event-based simulator
to show that the attacker discovery mechanisms can rapidly
identify malicious nodes with low error rate. We calculate the
anonymity of Octopus using probabilistic modeling and show
that Octopus can achieve near-optimal anonymity. We evaluate
Octopus’s efficiency on Planetlab with 207 nodes and show
that Octopus has reasonable lookup latency and manageable
communication overhead.
Keywords-Anonymity, security, DHT, lookup
I. INTRODUCTION
Structured peer-to-peer networks, such as Chord [1] or
Kademlia [2], allow the creation of scalable distributed
applications that can support millions of users. They have
been used to build a number of successful applications,
including P2P file sharing (Overnet, Kad, Vuze DHT1) and
content distribution (CoralCDN [3]), and many others have
been proposed, such as distributed file systems [4], anony-
mous communication systems [5]–[9], and online social
networks [10], [11]. At the heart of these networks lies a
distributed hash table (DHT) lookup mechanism that imple-
ments a decentralized key–value store. The DHT allows effi-
cient storage and coordination among very large collections
of nodes; however, its decentralized nature creates a number
of security and privacy vulnerabilities. Because peers have
to rely on other peers to determine the state of the network,
malicious nodes could provide misinformation to misdirect
an honest user’s lookups [12]. Likewise, nodes can profile
the lookup activities of other nodes and learn what files or
websites they are interested in or who their friends may
be. Recent research shows that anonymous communication
1http://www.vuze.com/
systems based on anonymity-deficient DHT lookups have
severe vulnerabilities to information leak attacks [13], [14].
To address these issues, our goal is to design a lookup
mechanism that achieves both security and anonymity
(where anonymity means no information is revealed about
which nodes are looking up which values), heretofore an
open problem. We note that security is a necessary condition
for anonymity, because without security, malicious nodes
can misdirect the lookup towards colluding nodes and learn
about the lookup target. On the other hand, security is not
a sufficient condition for anonymity. Some existing lookup
schemes designed to resist active attacks are not suitable to
build anonymous DHT systems, e.g., due to heavily relying
on redundant transmission that leaks information about the
lookup initiator and/or target [15]–[17]. Furthermore, even
with a secure lookup that itself does not cause information
leak, an inappropriate design of the DHT system can still
lead to anonymity vulnerabilities [14].
Our contributions in this work include:
1) We propose a suite of novel security mechanisms–
attacker discovery for DHT systems. Our mechanisms proac-
tively identify and remove malicious peers. We develop an
event-based simulator to show that our identification mecha-
nism is capable of rapidly discovering malicious nodes with
low error rate. For a network with 20% malicious nodes, it
can correctly identify all attacking nodes within 30 minutes.
We compare our scheme with Halo [16], a state-of-the-art
secure DHT system, and show that our scheme provides
better robustness against active attacks. Furthermore, our
design does not rely on redundant transmission, and thus
is suitable to construct anonymous DHT systems.
2) With the proposed security mechanisms, we put
forward a secure and anonymous DHT lookup Octopus.
Octopus splits individual queries used in a lookup over
multiple anonymous paths, and introduces dummy queries,
to make it difficult for an adversary to learn the eventual
target of a lookup. Unlike most previous works that only
analytically evaluate the systems’ anonymity, we use proba-
bilistic modelling with the help of simulation to calculate
the information leak, so that users can know how much
anonymity can be actually provided by the system. We show
that Octopus provides near-optimal anonymity for both the
lookup initiator and target. In a network of 100 000 nodes
with 20% malicious nodes, Octopus only leaks 0.57 bit of
information about the initiator and 0.82 bit of information
about the target; these are 6 times and 4 times better
than what previous works [7], [8] were able to achieve,
respectively.
3) For performance evaluation, we measure the lookup la-
tency of Octopus on Planetlab with 207 nodes, and compare
it with the base-line scheme Chord [1] and Halo [16]. The
lookup latency of Octopus is comparable to that of Chord,
and even better than that of Halo. While Octopus incurs
relatively higher communication overhead than Chord and
Halo to provide extra security and/or anonymity guarantees,
the bandwidth consumption of Octopus is still manageable,
which is only a few kbps for each node.
The remainder paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the system model. We describe our security and
anonymity mechanisms in Section III and Section IV. The
efficiency evaluation is provided in Section V and Section VI
presents the related work. We conclude in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Threat Model
In the same vein of related works [5]–[9], [17], [18], we
do not consider a global adversary that is capable of con-
trolling the whole network and observing all communication
traffic. Such a global adversary seems unpractical in large-
scaled P2P networks. Instead, we assume a partial adversary
that controls a fraction f of all nodes in the network (f is
typically assumed to be up to 20%). Malicious nodes can
behave in an arbitrarily malicious way, such as intercepting,
modifying or dropping any messages going through them, or
injecting fake messages to any other nodes . We also assume
that malicious nodes can log any messages they have seen
and access to a high-speed communication channel to share
any information with very low transmission delay.
Also similar to related works, we do not attempt to solve
the problem of Sybil attack [19] in this work. Defending
sybil attack is an interesting research area that has drawn
a lot of attentions; a number of effective solutions have
been proposed, such as [20]–[22]. All these solutions are
applicable to Octopus as extensions to resist Sybil attacks.
B. Design Goals
The major goal for security is to avoid lookups being
biased by malicious nodes. In other words, given a lookup
target, it should not be possible to misdirect the lookup path
or bias the final lookup result.
Pfitzmann and Hansen defined several relevant anonymity
properties for message-based communication, such as sender
and receiver anonymity [23]. We consider equivalent prop-
erties in the context of DHT lookups.
• Initiator anonymity: given a lookup target, it should not
be possible to determine its initiator.
• Target anonymity: given a lookup initiator, it should not
be possible to determine its target.
• Query unlinkability: given several queries with known
targets, it should not be possible to find out if they came
from the same initiator.
III. SECURITY MECHANISMS OF OCTOPUS
A. Problem Description
In a DHT system, like Chord [1], each node is assigned a
unique ID associated with its IP address, and owns the IDs
from itself to its direct predecessor on the ring. Each node X
maintains a list of Θ(logN) contact nodes (called fingers),
where N is the network size, and the i-th finger of X is
the owner (or successor) of the ID idX + 2i−1 (the first
finger, i.e., i = 1, is X’s direct successor). Besides, each
node maintains a list of successor nodes for stabilization.
Some DHTs [24] also utilize the list of successors during
lookups to speed up the lookup process in the last few hops.
We study the more general case where the successor lists
are used in lookups. We refer to the combination of the
fingertable and the successor list as the routing table. More
specifically, we consider the following lookup procedure.
Assuming a lookup initiator I wants to find the owner of
value v, it first queries n1, the node that is closest to v in
its routing table, and n1 sends its routing table to I 2. Then
out of n1’s routing table, I finds the node n2 closest to
v and asks n2 for its routing table. The process iteratively
proceeds until reaching nk, for which one of its successors
is the owner of v (i.e., the lookup target).
Some of the queried nodes could be malicious and attempt
to launch the following attacks.
1) Lookup Bias Attack: If the last queried node nk is
malicious, it can replace the honest nodes in its successor
list with malicious nodes, so that one of its (malicious)
“successors” will be concerned as the lookup target.
2) Lookup Misdirection Attack: Instead of trying to bias
the lookup result, malicious nodes could attempt to make I
query more malicious nodes during the lookup, by providing
manipulated fingertables (i.e., replacing honest fingers with
malicious nodes). This attack is a big threat to anonymity
since the adversary can learn more information about the
lookup target from a larger number of queried malicious
nodes [14].
3) Finger Pollution Attack: In a DHT system, each node
periodically performs lookups to update its fingers. An attack
related to this is that malicious nodes could attempt to
pollute honest nodes’ fingertables during the finger-update
lookups, so that the polluted fingertables can contribute to
the lookup bias and misdirection attacks.
2In vanilla DHT lookups, I tells v to each queried node, which will
return the finger closest to v; however, this reveals the lookup target to
malicious intermediate nodes. Hence, for anonymous lookups, I asks each
intermediate node for its full routing table, without revealing v.
B. Security Mechanisms
Many existing secure DHT designs [6], [15], [16] employ
redundant queries or lookups to tolerate misinformation
provided by malicious nodes. However, the redundant trans-
mission creates more opportunities for an adversary to gain
information about the lookup initiator and/or target [13].
Some schemes [17], [18] utilize quorum-based topologies
and threshold cryptography to limit byzantine adversaries,
but they also require the initiator to contact multiple nodes
at each step of the lookup (for cryptographic operations),
which accelerates information leak. Some other schemes,
such as Myrmic [25], prevent routing table manipulation by
introducing a central trusted authority to sign each node’s
routing table; however, this approach is impractical since
for each node join or churn, the authority has to regenerate
the signatures for all related nodes, rendering a performance
bottleneck.
To effectively limit active attacks while minimizing infor-
mation leak, we propose a new defense strategy by letting
each (honest) node secretly check the correctness of other
nodes’ routing tables. Such checks are preformed offline
(i.e., independent of lookups), and thus do not reveal any
information of lookups. To punish discovered malicious
nodes, we use a certificate authority (CA) to issue certificates
and revoke certificates from identified malicious nodes so
that the malicious nodes can be gradually removed from the
system. We note that the CA in our case is fundamentally
different from that of Myrmic [25]. The latter is required
to be online all the time and needs to update signatures
for multiple nodes for each node churn/join. Whereas, the
certificates in our scheme are independent of nodes’ routing
states and thus do not need to be updated frequently. Our
simulation results show that the workload of our CA is
sufficiently low and can be handled by most Internet servers.
There has been several fairly efficient and scalable revo-
cation mechanisms in the literature, such as Merkle Hash
Tree based certificate revocation [26], efficient distribution
of revocation information over P2P networks [27], and
scalable PKI based on P2P systems [28]. Since certificate
management in our scheme is essentially the same as these
systems, we do not particularly study certificate revocation
in this work.
1) Secret Neighbor Surveillance: To limit the lookup bias
attack, we propose secret neighbor surveillance, a mecha-
nism that prevent malicious neighbors from manipulating
their successor lists.
In particular, we let each node maintain a predecessor
list, in the same way as maintaining the successor list
(i.e., periodically running Chord stabilization protocol anti-
clockwise). The predecessor list is of the same size as the
successor list, and thus each node X should be contained in
the successor list of any of its predecessors. In other words,
if X is not contained in the successor list of its predecessor,
it means this predecessor is trying to manipulating its
successor list by replacing X with another node. Our goal
is to let X detect this.
P1
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P3's succ-list
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X
Figure 1: Secret neighbor surveillance. X is checking if itself is
included in its predecessor P3’s successor list. If not, it means P3
manipulates its successor list by replacing X with another node.
In the lookup bias attack, a malicious node provides a
manipulated successor list in response to lookup queries.
Therefore, we let X anonymously sends a “lookup query”
to one of its predecessors, say P3 (see Figure 1), and checks
if itself is included in P3’s successor list. “Anonymously”
is required since if the malicious node can distinguish a
testing query from real lookup queries based on the querier’s
identity, it can always provide the correct successor list
for testing queries to avoid being detected. The anonymous
transmission can be achieved by using the basic onion
routing technique [29], i.e., X chooses two randomly peers
as relays to forward its query to P3 while using onion
encryption to ensure each hop on the forwarding path can
only know its previous and next hops. The two relay nodes
can be found by performing a l-hop random walk on the
overlay network (where l = Θ(logN)). The details of the
random walk are provided in Appendix A.
X performs the above checks from time to time (i.e.,
with time interval tc ∈R (0, Tm] where Tm is the maximum
checking interval) on randomly selected successors. A de-
tected malicious node will be reported to the CA. To provide
a non-repudiation proof on a manipulated successor list (i.e.,
verifiable to the CA), we let each node sign its routing table
and attach a time stamp to it.
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Figure 2: Successor list pollution. The malicious successor P2
pollutes P3’s successor list in P3’s stabilization by providing a
manipulated successor list.
Another strategy to launch the lookup bias attack is to
pollute honest nodes’ successor lists during stabilization. For
example, as shown in Figure 2, assuming P2 is malicious
and P3 is honest, P2 can send P3 a manipulated successor
list excluding X during P3’s stabilization, so that P3 will
concern X as dead and remove X from its successor list;
consequently, P3 will be mistakenly identified as a malicious
successor by X and P2 will still be uncovered. To deal
with this, we let each node sign its successor list used
in stabilization; also, each node keeps a queue of latest
received successor lists in stabilization as proof, to prove
that its successor list is not intentionally manipulated. For
example, P3 can provide its proof to the CA showing
that its successor list is correctly computed according to
the information provided by P2. If P3’s proof is verified
(according to the stabilization algorithm) by the CA, then
the suspicion on P3 is cleared and the CA will request P2
for its proof, and check it against P3’s proof. This process
is repeated until finding a node that cannot provide valid
proofs and this node is then judged as the malicious node.
2) Secret Finger Surveillance: Likewise, we propose a
secret finger surveillance mechanism for the lookup misdi-
rection attack by limiting malicious nodes from manipulating
their fingertables in the lookup.
Y
P1'
P2'
F
F'
Ideal 
finger ID
X
Pred-list of F'
P1'
P2'
Routing 
table of P1'
True finger
Figure 3: Secret finger surveillance. X is checking if node Y has
replaced its finger F with a malicious node F ′. X first asks F ′ for
its predecessor list, and then anonymously sends a “lookup query”
to a random node P1 in F ′’s predecessor list. If any node in P1’s
successor list is closer to the ideal finger ID than F ’, X detects Y
manipulated its fingertable.
In particular, we let each node keep a small number of
received fingertables (e.g., from lookups, secret neighbor
surveillance, or random walks). From time to time, node X
chooses a random finger from one of the kept fingertables,
say the i-th finger F ′ of node Y , and asks F ′ for its
predecessor list (see Figure 3). Then, after waiting a short
random period of time, X anonymously sends a “lookup
query” to a random predecessor of F ′ (say P ′1), and checks
if any node in P ′1’s successor list is closer to the ideal finger
ID than F ′ (i.e., F ′ is not the true finger F ).
The intuition behind this is that if Y replaces a honest
finger F with a malicious node F ′, at least one of F ′’s (true)
predecessors should be closer to the ideal finger ID than F ′.
Hence, if F ′ provides X with its true predecessor list, the
fingertable manipulation will be detected. Therefore, F ′ has
to manipulate its predecessor list to ensure that all the “pre-
decessors” are malicious, so that the selected predecessor P ′1
can collude with F ′ by providing a manipulated successor
list that is consistent with the predecessor list provided by
F ′. On the other hand, however, P ′1 cannot freely manipulate
its successor list, since P ′1 is under surveillance by its
neighbors (i.e., secret neighbor surveillance). Therefore, if
the adversary tries to manipulate a single finger (F → F ′),
she has to sacrifice at least one malicious node, either P ′1 or
F ′ and Y .
3) Secure Finger Update: We can invoke the secret finger
surveillance to limit the finger pollution attack: when X
obtains the result (say F ′) of the finger-update lookup, it asks
F ′ for its predecessor list, and chooses a random predecessor
P ′1 of F ′ to perform the same checks as in the secret finger
surveillance to verify F ′ is the true finger; X uses F ′ to
update its fingertable only when F ′ passes these checks.
C. Security Evaluation
We use the following metrics to evaluate our security
mechanisms.
• fraction of remaining malicious nodes,
• false positive rate, i.e., the chance that a honest node
is judged as a malicious node,
• false negative rate, i.e., the chance that a malicious
node is not identified when being tested by a node,
• false alarm rate, i.e., the chance that there is no node
identified in a report sent to the CA.
These metrics represent different aspects of security prop-
erties. Reduction of malicious nodes shows effectiveness,
false positive/negative rates represent accuracy, and false
alarm rate indicates efficiency.
1) Experiment Setup: We developed an event-based sim-
ulator in C++ with about 3.0 KLOC. We consider a WAN
setting, where latencies between each pair of peers are
estimated using the King dataset [30]. We model node
churn/join as an exponential distribution process f(x) =
λe−(1/λ)x with mean life time λ minutes. We generate
random network topologies of size N = 1000 with 20%
malicious nodes. Each node maintains 12 fingers and 6
successors/predecessors (on the order of Θ(logN)). With
similar configurations as related works [1], [9], we let each
node run successor and predecessor stabilization protocols
every 2 seconds, and performs finger update every 30 sec-
onds. To discover malicious nodes, each peer performs secu-
rity checks of secret neighbor surveillance and secret finger
surveillance every 60 seconds3. To ensure high identification
accuracy, each node keeps 6 latest received successor lists as
3This is based on the frequency of stabilization and finger update as well
as the node churn rate, and we found that doing security checks every 60s
is sufficient to rapidly discover malicious nodes.
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Figure 4: Simulation results of the security mechanisms
proofs. Besides, we let each node perform one lookup every
minute (we choose 1 min only because we want to test a
large number of lookups within a relatively short simulation
time).
2) Experimental Results: We see from Figure 4a that the
secret neighbor surveillance mechanism can rapidly identify
malicious nodes that try to bias lookups. After a short time
(20 mins), almost all malicious nodes are discovered. In
comparison, the speed of discovering malicious nodes by
the secret finger surveillance mechanism is relatively slower
(as shown in Figure 4b), but still it can identify over 80%
malicious nodes within 30 mins. The speed of identifying
malicious nodes by the secure finger update mechanism is
faster than that of the secure finger surveillance (as shown in
Figure 4c), because the former is performed more frequently
(at each finger update) and some malicious fingers contained
in the successor list can also be detected by the secret
neighbor surveillance.
The accuracy of our attacker discovery mechanisms is
shown in Table I. The false positive rate is 0 for all the three
mechanisms even when the churn rate is very high (e.g.,
the mean life time for each node is 10 mins). This ensures
that honest nodes will not be judged as malicious nodes
by mistake. In addition, the secret neighbor surveillance
has very low false negative rate (less than 0.6%), which
implies that any malicious nodes that try to bias lookups
can be caught with high probability. We also see that
the false negative rates for the secret finger surveillance
and secure finger update mechanisms are relatively higher.
This is because a malicious finger can pass the security
checks if the randomly selected predecessor happens to be
a colluding node and provides a successor list consistent
with the malicious finger. However, over time, a malicious
node can be identified with very high probability as shown
in Figure 4.
We also compare our scheme with a state-of-the-art secure
DHT scheme Halo [16] in terms of the number of biased
lookups over time. We calculate the ratio of biased lookups
of Halo according to their analysis results [16] §4.1 using the
parameter l = 7 as they suggested. We can see from Figure 5
that after a short period of time, there are no more biased
lookups in Octopus, while the number of biased lookups
of Halo keeps increasing in linear with the total number
of lookups. This demonstrates that our security mechanisms
can fundamentally thwart active attacks.
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Figure 5: Security comparison
Finally, We evaluate the workload of the CA in terms of
the number of messages (including reports, proofs, and etc)
processed over time. We can see from Figure 6 that even
during the peak time (the first 10 min), the CA only needs
to process about 2 messages per second on average, which
can be handled by most Internet servers.
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Figure 6: The CA’s workload
D. Other Attacks, Countermeasures, and Discussion
We also consider other potential attacks, such as the selec-
tive denial-of-service attack and the relay exhaustion attack;
we discuss these attacks and propose countermeasures in
Appendix.
Table I: False positive/negative/alarm rates of the security mechanisms. λ is mean life time of each node (in minute). Attack rate is 100%.
In fingertable manipulation/pollution attacks, checked malicious predecessors provide manipulated successor lists with 50% chance.
Security mechanisms False Positive False Negative False Alarm
λ = 60m λ = 10m λ = 60m λ = 10m λ = 60m λ = 10m
Secret neighbor surveillance 0 0 0 0.52% 0 0.52%
Secret finger surveillance 0 0 14.02% 19.55% 0.18% 1.55%
Secure finger update 0 0 14.08% 18.48% 0.33% 2.18%
IV. ANONYMITY MECHANISMS OF OCTOPUS
A. Problem Description
In vanilla DHT systems, since the lookup initiator I
queries intermediate nodes directly, the queried nodes can
easily infer the I’s identity. A natural idea to let I hide its
identity by sending queries through an anonymous path, as
in attacker identification mechanisms. An illustration of this
is shown in Figure 7.
 
B
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E3E4T
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Figure 7: T is the lookup target, I → A→ B is the anonymous
path, and Ei’s are queried nodes.
However, we note that a single anonymous path is in-
sufficient to achieve high levels of anonymity. We use the
example in Figure 7 to show this. Assume queried nodes
E2 and E4 are malicious, and the first relay A is also
malicious. With a single anonymous path, the adversary can
learn that E2 and E4 belong to the same lookup since they
are contacted by the same exit node B. Wang et al. [14]
have shown that based on the positions of a few queried
malicious nodes in the lookup, the adversary can narrow the
range of the lookup target into a small set of nodes (called
range estimation attack). Suppose there are c concurrent
lookups each having an estimation range of d nodes; then,
the adversary can know that I is doing an lookup and its
target is one of the c · d nodes.
B. Anonymity Mechanisms
To address the limitation of a single anonymous path, we
propose to split lookup queries over multiple anonymous
paths, as shown in Figure 8.
Using separate anonymous paths for different queries
effectively disassociates the adversary’s observations. The
adversary only sees disjoint events from different concurrent
lookups, but is unable to group queries belonging to the same
lookup; in this case, it is much harder to apply the range
I A B
C3
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C1
D3
D4
D2
D1
E3
E4
E2
E1
Figure 8: The structure of multiple anonymous paths in Octopus.
A, B, Ci and Di are relays.
estimation attack, thus substantially limiting the information
leak.
Moreover, to further blur the adversary’s observations and
make the range estimation attack even harder, we propose to
add dummy queries in the lookup. Then, even though in rare
cases the adversary can link two queried nodes in the same
lookup (e.g., when all the relays used for the two queries are
malicious), the adversary is unable to tell whether they are
dummy queries or true queries, and the result of the range
estimation attack would be incorrect with a dummy query.
We note that using multiple anonymous paths is important
to ensure effectiveness of dummy queries, because in the
single-anonymous-path scenario, observed queries are link-
able due to the common exit relay and hence dummy queries
can be distinguished based on the positions of observed
queries. In comparison, with multiple anonymous paths,
identifying dummy queries is much harder.
C. Anonymity Evaluation
We analyze the best strategies for an adversary to infer the
lookup target T and the initiator I based its observations,
and calculate the target anonymity H(T ) and the initiator
anonymity H(I). We use entropy to quantify H(T ) and
H(I). We let O denote the set of possible observations of
the adversary (including null observation). To measure the
system as a whole, we have:
H(T ) =
∑
o∈O
P (o)·H(T |o), H(I) =
∑
o∈O
P (o)·H(I|o) (1)
where P (o) is the probability of observation o occurring.
To calculate the maximum information leak, we make the
following assumptions in the anonymity calculation. First,
we assume the network is static, since network dynamics
can obscure the adversary’s observations and make it more
difficult to extract information about the initiator/target.
Second, we only consider passive attacks, as active attackers
can be quickly identified by our security mechanisms and
consequently the adversary will lose observers to carry out
passive attacks.
1) The Adversary’s Observations: An observation o con-
sists of a (large) number of observed events, which are mes-
sage transmissions seen by malicious nodes. Each observed
event can provide information, such as sender/receiver IDs,
message content, and transmission time. The adversary can
log all the observed events, and try to derive useful infor-
mation from any combinations of them.
Observations of queries. There are two cases where a
query is observed (i.e., the queried node is identified): 1)
the queried node itself is malicious, or 2) the exit relay is
malicious. The adversary can link an observed query back-
wards to I in two ways. One is through direct connection of
compromised relays on the anonymous path. For example, if
the relays A and Ci and the queried node Ei are malicious
(refer to Figure 8), Ei is observed and can be linked to I
using Ci and A as bridges. The other is through linkability
of relays to I in the random walk. For instance, if Di is
compromised and linkable to I in the random walk, then Ei
is observed and linkable to I using Di as a shortcut. It is
possible to use both approaches at the same time.
Furthermore, considering all queries in the same lookup
together can help the adversary link more queries to I . Since
all (Ci, Di) in the same lookup are connected to the same
relay B, if there exists one query linkable to both I and B,
then any other queries that are linkable to B can also be
linked to I . In the rest paper, we use “a linkable query” to
specifically refer to a query that is observed and linkable to
I .
Observations of the initiator. The adversary’s goal is
to link I and T ; knowing only one of them is useless to
the adversary. Therefore, the pre-condition of compromising
the target anonymity is to observe I . Since I is directly
connected to A, the adversary can observe I as long as A is
malicious. In addition, I is also observable in random walks;
hence, another case for I being observed is that there exists
at least one malicious relay linkable to I in a random walk.
Observation of the target. For similar reasons, in order
to compromise the initiator anonymity, the adversary has
to know T . We note that T is not necessarily contacted
during the lookup, since the aim of the lookup is to find
the IP address of T , which can be learnt from query replies
of intermediate nodes (after the lookup is done, T might
be contacted due to some application needs, but we do not
consider this as part of the lookup). Yet we assume that each
node can tell whether itself is a target node based on its role
in the application. For example, in DHT-based anonymous
communication, a node can learn that itself is a lookup target
if it is selected as a relay of an anonymous circuit. Therefore,
we concern T as observed if T itself is a malicious node.
2) Initiator Anonymity: To calculate the initiator
anonymity, we divide the observations of the adversary into
two categories.
• on: the observation occurring when T is not observed
• Oo: the set of observations occurring when T is ob-
served
According to 1, H(I) is calculated as:
H(I) = P (on) ·H(I|on) +
∑
oo∈Oo
P (oo) ·H(I|oo) (2)
When T is not observed, the entropy of I is maximized.
Presuming that the adversary can exclude malicious nodes
from the anonymity set of I , we have:
H(I|on) = log2 ((1 − f) ·N) (3)
Let RlT denote the set of non-dummy queries linkable to
I in the lookup whose target is T . Then, based on whether
RlT is an empty set, we calculate H(I|oo) as follows:
H(I|oo) = P (R
l
T = ∅) ·H
′(I|oo)
+ (1− P (RlT = ∅)) ·H
′′(I|oo) (4)
When there is no linkable non-dummy query, I is un-
linkable with T . However, since some of the initiators of
concurrent lookups can be observed by the adversary, we
have:
H ′(I|oo) = P (I obsv) · log2(#obsv hon init)
+ (1− P (I obsv)) · log2((1 − f) ·N) (5)
Let Ψl denote the set of concurrent lookups that have at
least one linkable query, and ψT denote the lookup with
target T . When RlT 6= ∅, ψT ∈ Ψl. Each lookup in Ψl is
possible to be ψT . Therefore, we have:
H ′′(I|oo) = −
∑
ψ∈Ψl
P (ψ = ψT |oo) · log2 P (ψ = ψT |oo)
(6)
Because the density of queries close to the target is
higher than other regions on the ring, for ψT it is highly
likely that the last queried node in RlT is located very
close to T . Therefore, the adversary can assign probability
to each candidate initiator based on the minimum distance
(i.e. number of hops) between its queried nodes and T . In
particular, let Qlψ denote the set of linkable queries in ψ,
ψ ∈ Ψl, and let ξ(x) denote the probability that for ψT
the minimum distance from linkable queried nodes to T is
x. ξ(x) can be obtained via pre-simulations of the lookup.
Then, we can calculate P (ψ = ψT |oo) as follows:
P (ψ = ψT |oo) ≈
ξ(minE∈Ql
ψ
dist(E, T ))
∑
ψ′∈Ψl ξ(minE′∈Ql
ψ′
dist(E′, T ))
(7)
3) Target Anonymity: We categorize the adversary’s ob-
servations into three classes:
• on: the observation occurring when I is not observed
• Ol: the set of observations occurring when there is at
least one linkable query in the lookup
• Od: the set of observations occurring when there is no
linkable query in the lookup
According to Equation (1), we have:
H(T ) = P (on) ·H(T |on) +
∑
ol∈Ol
P (ol) ·H(T |ol)
+
∑
od∈Od
P (od) ·H(T |od) (8)
Since the adversary has to know I at the first place, the
entropy of T is maximum when I is not observed, i.e.
H(T |on) = log2N .
Calculation of H(T |ol). When there exist queries that
are linkable to I , the adversary can adopt range estimation
attack to narrow the range of T . The output of this attack is
a lower bound and an upper bound of T ’s location on the
ring.
We temporarily assume that all queries observed by the
adversary are non-dummy queries (how to deal with dummy
queries is shown later). Suppose there are two or more
linkable queries in the lookup. Let Ei and Ej denote the
first and the last linkable queried nodes, respectively. Since
nodes succeeding T will not be queried in the lookup, Ej
can be used as a lower bound of T . An upper bound of T
can be obtained based on the fact that the lookup always
greedily queries the finger that is precedingly closest to the
target. In particular, the adversary first decides the queried
nodes between Ei and Ej by (locally) simulating the lookup
from Ei to Ej . The initial upper bound is set as Ei; then
for each pair of consecutive queries (Ek, Ek+1) between Ei
and Ej , i ≤ k ≤ j − 1, the adversary finds out the index of
Ek+1 in Ek’s finger table (say p) and uses the (p + 1)-th
finger of Ek to update the upper bound.
Since the density of queries close to T on the ring is
higher than other regions, nodes located closer to T in the
estimation range are more likely to be T . We let γ(i, z)
denote the probability that the i-th node (clockwise) in an
estimation range of size z is the target, 1 ≤ i ≤ z. The
probability distribution of γ(i, z) can be obtained by pre-
simulation of the lookup. Note that the range estimation
attack is inapplicable when the lookup has only one linkable
query (say Ei), but the adversary can use the successor of
Ei as the lower bound of T and the predecessor of Ei as
the upper bound of T , and assign higher probabilities to the
nodes closer to the lower bound in the estimation range.
Now we discuss how to deal with dummy queries. Let QlI
denote the set of linkable queries in the lookup performed
by I , and RlI denote the set of linkable non-dummy queries,
RlI ⊆ Q
l
I . Based on whether RlI is an empty set, H(T |ol)
can be calculated as:
H(T |ol) = P (R
l
I = ∅) ·Hm
+ (1 − P (RlI = ∅)) ·H
′(T |ol) (9)
Hm denotes the entropy when all linkable queries are
dummies. In this case, the linkable queries cannot provide
any information about T . However, the adversary can ob-
serve all (concurrent) malicious target nodes, and T has
chance f to be one of them. Therefore, we have:
Hm = (1 − f) · log2((1− f) ·N)
+ f · log2(#mal targets) (10)
When RlI is non-empty, a range estimation attack based
on RlI can produce a minimum range of T . Whereas, an
estimation range calculated using any dummy query will
be incorrect. Due to use of anonymous paths, an individual
dummy query is indistinguishable from any non-dummy
query. Nevertheless, the adversary can base on timing and
location relationships between queries to filter out some
subsets of QlI that contain dummy queries. In particular,
any subset of queries that violates the following rules must
contain at least one dummy query:
• if Ei is queried before Ej , then Ei must precede Ej
• if Ei and Ej are the first and last queried nodes in the
subset, then any other query must be on the path of the
virtual lookup from Ei to Ej
Note that the above approach cannot remove all subsets
that contain dummy queries. Let SI denote all subsets of QlI
that pass the above filtering test, SI ⊆ 2Q
l
I
. Since all queries
in RlI are non-dummy, RlI will pass the filtering test, i.e.,
RlI ∈ SI . From the adversary’s prospective, each element
of SI is possible to be RlI . The best strategy for her is to
assign different probability to each element in SI according
to the pre-calculated probability distribution of RlI . We use
two variables to characterize RlI : the number of queries in
RlI , and the largest hop in the virtual lookup from the first
query in RlI to the last query.4
Let X denote an arbitrary node that is contained in any
estimation range. Then:
H ′(T |ol) = −
∑
X
P (X = T |ol) · log2 P (X = T |ol) (11)
Let G(s) denote the estimation range computed based on
s, s ∈ SI . Let loc(G(s), X) denote the location of X in
the estimation range G(s), and | · | denote the number of
elements of a set. Then, we have:
P (X = T |ol) =
∑
s∈SI
P (s = RlI |ol)·γ(loc(G(s), X), |G(s)|)
(12)
4The largest hop means the largest ID difference between two consec-
utively queried nodes. The largest hop also implies the number of hops
in the lookup. These two characteristics are a close approximation of the
adversary’s observation on Rl
I
.
Let V (s) denote the largest hop in the virtual lookup
based on s, and χ(x, y) denote the probability that a set
of x queries with the largest hop in the virtual lookup being
y is RlI . Then, we have:
P (s = RlI |ol) ≈
χ(|s|, V (s))∑
s′∈SI
χ(|s′|, V (s′))
(13)
χ(x, y) is obtained by pre-simulations of the lookup.
Calculation of H(T |od). There are three possible cases
when there is no linkable query:
• case1: there is no query observed by the adversary
• case2: there is at least one (observed) query that is
linkable to B
• case3: there is no query linkable to B but at least one
query is observed by the adversary
Let H1, H2, and H3 denote the entropy of T in the three
cases, respectively. Then, we have:
H(T |od) = P (case1) ·H1 + P (case2) ·H2
+ P (case3) ·H3 (14)
In the first case, since no information is learnt from
queries, H1 is calculated as Equation (10).
For the second case, although I is disassociated with any
observed queries, the adversary can group queries belonging
to the same lookup based on whether they are linkable to a
common relay B. Furthermore, she can calculate estimation
ranges for each concurrent lookup that contains queries
linkable to B, and consider all estimation ranges as possible
candidates for the true estimation range of T .
In particular, we let RBI denote the set of non-dummy
queries linkable to B in the lookup performed by I , and H2
can be calculated as follows.
H2 = P (R
B
I = ∅) ·Hm + (1− P (R
B
I = ∅)) ·H
′
2 (15)
where H ′2 denotes the entropy when there is at least one non-
dummy query linkable to B. If T is malicious, the adversary
can reduce the candidates of T down to the set of observed
malicious targets; otherwise, she needs to rely on the queries
linkable to B to infer T . Therefore, we have:
H ′2 = f · log2(#mal targets) (16)
− (1− f) ·
∑
X
P (X = T |od) · log2 P (X = T |od)
Let ΨB denote the set of concurrent lookups that have at
least one query linkable to B, and ψI denote the lookup
performed by I . Let RBψ denote the set of non-dummy
queries linkable to B in ψ, ψ ∈ ΨB , and let Sψ denote all
subsets of queries (linked to B) in ψ that pass the filtering
test. Then, we have:
P (X = T |od) =
∑
ψ∈ΨB
P (ψ = ψI |od) (17)
·
∑
s∈Sψ
P (s = RBψ |od) · γ(loc(G(s), X), |G(s)|)
Since I is unlinkable to any observed queries, each
concurrent lookup is equally likely to be ψI . We have:
P (ψ = ψI |od) =
1
|ΨB|
, ∀ψ ∈ ΨB (18)
P (s = Rlψ|od) is calculated the same as Equation (13).
In the last case, since all observed queries are disasso-
ciated with each other, the range estimation attack cannot
be applied. Let RoI denote the set of observed non-dummy
queries in the lookup performed by I . Similar to the above
cases, we have:
H3 = P (R
o
I = ∅) ·Hm + (1 − P (R
o
I = ∅)) ·H
′
3 (19)
H ′3 = f · log2(#mal targets) (20)
− (1− f) ·
∑
X
P (X = T |od) · log2 P (X = T |od)
Let EI denote the query closest to T in RoI . Then, the
adversary can use EI ’s successor as the lower bound of the
estimation range of T and EI ’s predecessor as the upper
bound, and assign probabilities to the nodes in the range
according to a pre-calculated probability distribution of T .
Let Qo denote the set of observed queries of all concurrent
lookups, and G(E) denote the estimation range based on E.
Then, we have:
P (X = T |od) =
∑
E∈Qo
P (E = EI |od) (21)
·γ(loc(G(E), X), N − 1)
Based on the observations, the adversary is unable to tell
which query is more likely to be EI . Therefore, we have:
P (E = EI |od) =
1
|Qo|
, ∀E ∈ Qo (22)
D. Results and Comparisons
We developed a simulator for anonymity measurements
in C++ with about 1.3 KLOC. The results are shown in
Figure 10. With network size N = 100 000, concurrent
lookup rate a = 1%, f = 20% malicious nodes, and 6
dummies, Octopus only leaks 0.57 bits of information about
the initiator and 0.82 bits of information about the target. We
compare Octopus with the base-line scheme Chord [1] and
the state-of-the-art anonymous DHT lookups NISAN [7] and
Torsk [8] (we do not explicitly compare Octopus with secure
DHTs such as Halo [16], since they leak more information
than Chord.). We can see that in the same setting, NISAN
and Torsk leak about 3.3 bits of information about the
initiator, which is about 6 times more than Octopus. As for
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Figure 9: Anonymity evaluation of Octopus. a is the concurrent lookup rate.
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Figure 10: Anonymity comparison. a = 1%.
Table II: Performance comparison. τ is the time interval between
two consecutive lookups.
Schemes Lookup Latency (sec) Bandwidth Consumption (kbps)Mean Median τ = 5min τ = 10min
Octopus 2.15 1.61 5.91 4.30
Chord [1] 1.35 0.35 0.29 0.28
Halo [16] 6.89 1.79 0.71 0.37
the target anonymity, the information leak for NISAN and
Torsk is 11.3 bits and 3.4 bits, which is 13 times and 4 times
more than that of Octopus, respectively.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Lookup Latency
Lookup latency is one of the most important performance
factors for DHT systems. We measure the lookup latency of
Octopus using PlanetLab with 207 randomly selected nodes.
We use boost C++ library5 (mainly UDP asynchronous
read/write of Boost.Asio) to build the communication sub-
strate. We let each node perform 2000 lookups indepen-
dently using randomly picked lookup keys. For each lookup,
we record the latency from the time of sending out the first
query till the time of receiving the lookup result.
For comparison, we use the same methodology to im-
plement Chord [1] and Halo [16], and measure their lookup
latencies in the same network environment. We choose Halo
5www.boost.org
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Figure 11: Comparison of lookup latency on Planetlab.
because it is one of the state-of-the-art secure DHT lookup
schemes and it is also based on Chord overlay. For Halo, we
use degree-2 recursion with redundant parameter 8 × 4, as
suggested in their paper [16] to provide fairly strong security
guarantee. The experimental results are presented in Figure
11 and Table II. We can see that while the lookup latency of
Octopus is relatively longer than that of Chord due to more
transmission for security and anonymity needs, it is smaller
than that of Halo, which only provides security guarantees.
The outperformance is because Octopus does not rely on
redundant lookups, while in Halo a lookup is not completed
until all redundant lookups’ results are returned.
B. Bandwidth Overhead
We also compare Octopus with Chord and Halo in terms
of bandwidth cost. We adopt the same configuration as
described in Section III-C1 for each of the DHT lookups,
and consider an overlay network with 1 000 000 nodes6.
We can see from Table II that Octopus does incur higher
communication overhead than Chord and Halo, in order to
achieve high levels of anonymity; however, the bandwidth
cost of Octopus is still reasonable (only a few kbps), which is
affordable even for low-end clients with limited bandwidth.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Secure DHT Lookups
A major school of proposals to securing DHT lookups
uses redundancy. Castro et al. [15] proposed a robust
DHT system that relies on redundant lookups. Each key
is replicated among several replica nodes (typically the
neighbors of the key owner). Instead of doing a single
lookup, the initiator performs multiple redundant lookups
towards all the replicas. The lookup result would be correct
as long as one of the redundant lookups is not biased. The
limitation of this approach is that the redundant lookups
tend to converge to a small number of nodes close to the
target, and one malicious node in this set could infect many
redundant lookups. Much subsequent work (such as [6],
[16], [32]) focuses on disentangling the redundant lookup
paths to provide better security. Cyclone [32] partitions
nodes into r Chord sub-rings based on similarity of node
IDs, and has r redundant lookups routed through the r sub-
rings independently. Salsa [6] uses a new virtual-tree-based
DHT structure, in which any two nodes share few global
contacts so that redundant messages can proceed along
different paths. Halo [16] does not change the underlying
DHT structures, but uses the original Chord overlay and
performs redundant searches towards knuckles – nodes that
have fingers pointing to the target.
While effective in ensuring security, these redundant-
lookup-based approaches are incapable of preserving
anonymity, since redundant transmission creates opportuni-
ties for an adversary to gain information about the lookup
initiator and/or target [13]. ShadowWalker [9] embeds re-
dundancy into the DHT itself and uses shadows (nodes in
redundant topologies) to verify each step of a lookup. Un-
fortunately, Schuchard et al. [33] found that ShadowWalker
is vulnerable to eclipse attack, where the entire set of
shadows of a certain node are compromised, leading to
other nodes’ routing states being infected. They also showed
that increasing the dimension of redundant topologies can
mitigate the eclipse attack, but the resultant performance cost
is prohibitively high.
Another major school of research on secure DHT lookups
leverages cryptographic techniques. Mymric [25] uses an
6We use the following parameters to estimate the bandwidth overhead.
Each routing state item (such as fingers or successors) is 10 bytes. We use
ECDSA signature (40 bytes) for authentication with a 4-byte timestamp,
and AES-128 for onion encryption. Each certificate is 50 bytes, including
the node’s IP address (6 bytes), the node’s public key (20 bytes), expire
time (4 bytes), and the CA’s signature (20 bytes).
online certificate authority to sign each node’s routing state.
The major limitation of Myrmic is that for each node
join/churn, the central authority has to update the certifi-
cates for all related nodes. Young et al. [17] proposed two
schemes RCP-I and RCP-II that use threshold signature and
distributed key generation to avoid the reliance of a central
authority. In their schemes, the verification information on
each message is collaboratively generated by a threshold
number of nodes, rather by a central authority.
All these secure DHT lookup schemes are not designed
to preserve anonymity. Lookup keys are revealed during
queries, and identities of lookup initiators are easily exposed
due to directly contacting intermediate nodes.
B. Secure and Anonymous DHT Lookups
NISAN [7] is among the first to try to provide both
security and anonymity guarantees in DHT systems. For
security purpose, each queried node is required to provide
its entire fingertable, so that the lookup initiator can apply
bound checking on it to limit manipulation of fingerta-
bles. NISAN also uses redundancy to enhance security.
The authors proposed a greed-search mechanism to query
multiple nodes at each step and combine the query results
to tolerate misinformation. On the other hand, acquiring
the entire fingertable also helps protect the anonymity of
lookup targets, since the lookup keys are not revealed to
intermediate nodes. Nevertheless, NISAN can only provide
very limited anonymity protection. Wang et al. [14] showed
that a passive adversary is able to narrow the range of a
lookup target down to a small number of nodes, by analyzing
the locations of observed queries (called range estimation
attack).
Torsk [8] is a DHT-based anonymous communication sys-
tem. A key component of Torsk is a proxy-based anonymous
DHT lookup. The idea is that a lookup initiator performs
a random walk on the overlay to find a random node
(called buddy), and requests the buddy to perform the lookup
on its behalf. Because Torsk uses Myrmic [25] to secure
lookups, it has the same limitation as Myrmic – requiring
an online central authority to sign each node’s routing state.
In addition, as we analyzed in Section IV-A, a single proxy
structure is insufficient to provide high levels of anonymity:
the information learnt by the range estimation attack can be
used to launch relay exhaustion attack [14].
Recently, Backes et al. [18] proposed to leverage oblivious
transfer to add query privacy to RCP-I and RCP-II [17].
However, for similar reasons as NISAN, this scheme is
vulnerable to the range estimation attack, since the initiator
needs to contact multiple intermediate nodes at each step of
the lookup.
Freenet [34] is a deployed P2P system, which allows
people to upload sensitive files to the overlay and employs
data duplication strategies to make them hard to block.
Freenet aims to preserve the publishers’ privacy, but does
not provide anonymity in lookups. Vasserman et al. [35]
create a membership concealing overlay network (MCON)
for unobservable communication. They aim to make it
difficult for either an insider or outsider adversary to learn
the set of participating members. This is similar to previous
darknet designs [36]. However, MCON and darknets are not
designed to provide anonymity.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented Octopus, a new DHT lookup
that provides strong guarantees for both anonymity and
security. Octopus ensures security and anonymity via three
fundamental techniques. First, Octopus constructs an anony-
mous path to send lookup query messages while hiding
the initiator. Second, it splits the individual queries used
in a lookup over multiple paths, and introduces dummy
queries, to make it difficult for an adversary to learn the
lookup target. Third, it uses secret security checks to identify
and remove malicious nodes. We developed an event-based
simulator, and showed that malicious nodes can be quickly
identified with high accuracy. In addition, via probabilistic
modeling and simulation, we showed that Octopus can
achieve near-optimal anonymity for both the lookup initiator
and target. We also evaluated the efficiency of Octopus on
Planetlab, and showed that Octopus has reasonable lookup
latency and communication overhead.
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APPENDIX
A. Random Walk for Relay Selection
As shown in Figure 12, the random walk originates from
the initiator I and is composed of two phases, with l nodes
visited in each phase (l = Θ log(N)). The motivation of
dividing the random walk into two phases is to mitigate the
timing analysis attack, wherein malicious nodes on the same
anonymous path can be associated by analyzing timings of
packets in the traffic going through them. In the first phase, I
picks a random finger U1 out of its fingertable, and requests
U1 for its fingertable, from which the second hop U2 is
selected. Then I sends an onion-encrypted query to U2,
using U1 as the forwarding node, and selects the third hop U3
at random from the fingertable returned by U2. This process
is recursively repeated for l hops. To provide integrity check
and source authentication, each replied fingertable is signed
by its owner with the owner’s certificate attached.
U1 U2 Ul U2l-1 U2lI
First phase Second phase
A pair of relays selected for 
lookups or attacker identifications
Random seed
Figure 12: Two-phase random walk for selecting relays.
The second phase of the random walk is conducted by Ul,
the last node visited in the first phase. In particular, I sends
Ul a random seed through the anonymous path established
in the first phase, and the seed will guide Ul how to pick
nodes “randomly”. For example, we can let Ul apply hash
function to the seed for i times and map the hash value to
[1,m] (m is the size of fingertables) and use the result as an
index to select the i-th hop. The second phase is performed
in the same way as the first phase, and the last two hops
(U2l−1 and U2l) are chosen as a pair of relays to be used
in lookups or attacker identifications. To prevent malicious
Ul from biasing the random walk, Ul is required to keep all
received fingertables, signatures and certificates, and send
them back to I through the anonymous path of the first phase
at the end of the random walk. Such information allows I to
verify whether Ul has honestly performed the random walk.
If the verification is invalid or I does not receive the results
by a pre-set deadline, I chooses another node from Ul−1’s
fingertable to restart the second phase of the random walk.
B. Other Attacks, Countermeasures, and Discussion
1) Selective Denial-of-Service Attack: A threat to anony-
mous communication systems (like Tor [41]), the selective
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack [42], can increase the chance
of compromising anonymous circuits by selectively dropping
packets to tear down the circuits that are infeasible to
compromise. The selective DoS attack is also applicable
to Octopus. For example, to create more opportunities of
observing lookup initiators, malicious relays can selectively
drop lookup queries or replies, when the relay directly
connected to the initiator is not malicious. Nevertheless,
under our framework of attacker identification, Octopus can
effectively constrain the selective DoS attack by identifying
malicious droppers.
We leverage the reputation-based reliability enhancement
strategy for mix networks [43] to identify malicious dropper
nodes. The idea is as follows. Each message is assigned a
deadline by which it must be sent to the next hop (in either
direction along the anonymous path). A relay X first tries
to send the message to the next hop Y directly. If Y is alive
and honest, it will send a signed receipt back to X . If X has
not received a receipt from Y by a specified period before
the deadline, it will request a pre-defined set of witnesses
(e.g., its successors and predecessors) to independently try to
send the message to Y and obtain a receipt. If a witness gets
a valid receipt, it will forward it to X ; otherwise, it sends
X a signed statement to the delivery failure. Before sending
any query, the initiator first checks if the first pair of relays
A, B are alive (B is checked by A). During the lookup,
if the initiator does not receive the i-th query reply by the
pre-set deadline, it queries the successors and predecessors
of the relays Ci, Di (through the partial anonymous path A
and B) about their aliveness, which can be inferred based
on their recent stabilization activities. If both of them are
alive, the initiator reports the failure to the CA with the
identities of all the relays. Then the CA will request the
relays to provide either receipts or statements, and based on
the provided information, the CA will be able to identify the
malicious dropper node.
The (selective) DoS attacks are also possible in random
walks. For example, a malicious hop of the random walk
could simply drop packets to prevent the random walk from
being completed, or a malicious Ul could deny returning the
random walk result to the initiator if the result only contains
honest nodes. We can use the same strategy as above to
identify such malicious nodes.
We use the event-based simulator (described in Sec-
tion III-C1) to evaluate the defense mechanism for the
selective DoS attack. The simulation results are shown in
Figure 13. We can see that the malicious dropper nodes can
be rapidly discovered by our identification mechanism.
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Figure 13: Selective DoS attack
2) Relay Exhaustion Attack: The relay exhaustion at-
tack [14] is a selective-DoS-flavored attack used to compro-
mise DHT-based anonymity systems that are lack of target
anonymity protection. In such an attack, an adversary can
utilize the information leak about the lookup target to predict
the next relay of the circuit and launch flooding-based attack
to prevent the circuit from being extended to the next relay.
While Octopus also uses relays in the lookup, it is resistant
to the relay exhaustion attack, since little information about
the target is leaked in Octopus (as shown in Section IV-C).
3) End-to-End Timing Analysis Attack: The end-to-end
timing analysis attack is an attack that associates two ma-
licious relays (e.g., A and Di in Figure 8) on the same
anonymous path, by analyzing timings of packets in the
traffic going through them. Since in Octopus there is only
one message transmitted through each anonymous path in
either forward or backward direction, the timing analysis
attacks that require a large number of observed packets (such
as packet counting [37] or packet timing correlation [38],
[39]) are inapplicable to Octopus.
For Octopus, the only strategy to associate A and Di is us-
ing the similarity of upstream and downstream latencies: in
a noise-free network environment, the transmission latency
from A to Di should be the same as that from Di to A. How-
ever, this similarity is determined by communication latency
jitters and can be easily destroyed by adding a short random
delay at the middle relay B. We simulate this attack using
King dataset [30] to find a pair of A and Di with the smallest
difference between the upstream and downstream latencies.
A random delay is added at B from the range [0, Tm], where
Tm is the maximum delay. We choose a typical network
setting as used in related works [7], [9], [13], [14]: there
are N = 1 000 000 nodes in the network, 20% of them are
malicious nodes, and concurrent lookup rate a is between
0.5% - 5%; the jitter window for a pair of communicating
peers is set as 10 ms or 10% of the averaged transmission
latency whichever is smaller (according to [40]). Table III
presents the simulation results of this attack. When the
maximum delay Tm is 100 ms and a = 5%, the error rate is
as high as 99.91%; in this case the information leak is only
(1− 99.91%) · log2(N · 0.8 +N · α · 0.2) = 0.018 bit. This
means the adversary can hardly learn extra information by
launching the timing analysis attack.
Table III: Error rate of end-to-end timing analysis attack. a
is concurrent lookup rate.
Max. delay a = 0.5% a = 1% a = 5%
100 ms 99.35% 99.50% 99.91%
200 ms 99.60% 99.82% 99.95%
